Brazil is not often held up as a model of large-scale prevention success. Yet, over the past two decades, parts of the country have achieved outcomes that demand serious attention from the sexual violence prevention field. In Brazil’s Southeast region, home to some of the country’s largest cities and most complex social systems, rates of lethal violence against women declined sharply. These gains were not the result of a single program or cultural shift, but of sustained institutional effort across law, policy, and practice. For practitioners working in sexual violence prevention, Brazil’s experience offers rare evidence that prevention can operate at scale within a large, diverse society, even with socioeconomic inequalities. It challenges the assumption that meaningful reductions in harm are possible only in small or highly resourced settings.
In Brazil’s Southeast region, the female homicide rate declined by 42% over a defined study period, while rates increased in other parts of the country during the same time frame (GBD 2019 Brazil Collaborators 2024). This divergence matters for sexual violence prevention because female homicide is rarely an isolated event. Public health research links lethal violence against women to prior patterns of intimate partner violence, sexual coercion, stalking, and repeated abuse. When lethal outcomes decline, it often signals that earlier points along the violence continuum are being interrupted.
Brazil is one of the largest and most diverse countries in the world, with wide variation in institutional capacity, political conditions, and social inequality across regions. That diversity makes the Southeast’s reduction especially instructive. It suggests that prevention outcomes are shaped less by national culture or demographics than by how systems function in practice. Where institutions responded earlier, more consistently, and with clearer authority, extreme harm declined. For sexual violence prevention work, this distinction is critical. Sexual violence remains underreported everywhere, including the United States. As a result, researchers often use female homicide (particularly homicide occurring in domestic settings) as a conservative downstream indicator of failed prevention. A 2024 review published in BMC Public Health explains why this approach is widely used, noting that female homicide is strongly influenced by prior intimate partner and sexual violence, and that reductions in lethal outcomes are most likely when earlier forms of violence are addressed in targeted and sustained ways (GBD 2019 Brazil Collaborators 2024).
Brazil provides multiple points of evidence that institutional change can shift those trajectories. After the implementation of the Maria da Penha Law,[1] an evaluation by Brazil’s Institute for Applied Economic Research found an approximately 10% reduction in murders of women occurring inside the home, a proxy commonly used to capture lethal domestic and sexual violence (Cerqueira et al. 2015). This decline was strongest where legal reform was paired with operational capacity, including access to protective measures, coordination across institutions, and clearer enforcement responsibilities. Additional evidence comes from Brazil’s use of specialized intake infrastructure, most notably Women’s Police Stations. A quantitative study examining large metropolitan municipalities found that the presence of these intake mechanisms was associated with a 17% reduction in female homicide, with particularly strong effects among young women (Perova and Reynolds 2017). These findings underscore the prevention value of early institutional engagement that recognizes sexual and intimate partner violence and routes survivors toward protection before escalation occurs.
This example is best understood as a form of secondary and tertiary prevention. The Maria da Penha framework operates and intervenes once risk indicators or harm is already present, with the goal of interrupting escalation and preventing recurrence. It does not replace upstream efforts to shift norms, strengthen communities, or prevent first-time instances of harm. Rather, it illustrates that prevention also includes how systems respond after disclosure. Early protective measures, coordinated institutional response, and structured accountability function to reduce repeat victimization and lethality (which are core objectives of secondary and tertiary prevention). The field of prevention increasingly recognizes that a strong, predictable systemic response to sexual coercion and intimate partner violence can itself operate as a protective factor by limiting retaliation. When institutions respond swiftly, consistently, and without minimization, they can shift norms around accountability and impunity. While primary prevention remains essential, this case demonstrates that strengthening system response is also a legitimate and measurable prevention strategy because system response is part of a comprehensive prevention continuum.
Taken together, Brazil’s experience shows that large-scale reductions in extreme harm are possible when prevention is treated as a systems problem rather than an individual one. The Southeast’s 42% decline does not represent a national endpoint or a uniform success. It reflects what becomes possible when institutions intervene earlier, act more consistently, and sustain response over time. The strategies below examine how this was accomplished and what it suggests for sexual violence prevention efforts in places like New Jersey.
Strategy 1: Remove Discretion from Early Response
The Southeast’s reduction points to a specific institutional shift. Early response became expected rather than negotiable. The question was not whether institutions recognized sexual and intimate partner violence, but whether recognition reliably triggered action. The Maria da Penha Law mattered most where it functioned as enforceable infrastructure. Reports of sexual and domestic violence activated defined responses rather than case-by-case assessments of seriousness. The law authorized early protective measures, enabled removal of the persons who caused harm from the home, and required coordination across police, courts, and social services without forcing survivors to wait for criminal thresholds to be met (Cerqueira et al. 2015).
Under the statute, removal was not conceived as a standalone remedy. The Maria de Penha Law explicitly authorizes courts to require participation in education and rehabilitation programs for persons who cause harm (Articles 35 and 45). In Brazil’s Southeast region, specialized courts have operationalized these provisions through court-monitored “groupos reflexivos” (reflection groups) and related accountability programs tied to protective orders. Oversight by the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and evaluations by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) indicate that reductions in lethal violence were most effective as a stabilizing intervention when embedded within a broader structure of accountability rather than as an isolated act of separation.
At the same time, removing institutional discretion must not mean removing survivor agency. For many sexual violence survivors, control over timing, disclosure, and participation is itself protective. Early response structures are most effective when they reduce gatekeeping and delays within institutions while preserving survivor consent and buy-in at every stage. The aim is not to compel action against a survivor’s wishes, but to ensure that, when a survivor chooses to engage, the system is obligated to respond predictably and without minimization.
Where legal authority was paired with capacity (trained personnel, accessible courts, and enforceable protections), forms of violence occurring inside the home declined. Where those conditions were absent, the same legal framework produced far weaker effects (Cerqueira et al. 2015). For sexual violence prevention, the lesson is procedural. Systems organized around discretion delay intervention; systems organized around obligation act when risk is already known.
Implications for New Jersey
A prevention-oriented adaptation would focus on tightening points at which response becomes mandatory, including:
- Defining clear sexual violence and intimate partner violence (IPV) risk indicators that trigger action.
- Requiring time-bound protective responses once those indicators are present.
- Formalizing shared responsibility across institutions so early harm does not stall in referral loops.
*Note: Under Lei 11.340/2006, the emergency protective measures that are triggered are civil in nature and may be issued within 48 hours, without requiring a criminal conviction (Art. 22). Survivors may request specific measures, including removal of the person who caused harm, no-contact orders, or suspension of firearms access, and they are not required to pursue full criminal prosecution in order to obtain these protections. At the same time, following the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court’s 2012 ruling, certain cases may proceed as public criminal actions even if the victim later withdraws, if the risk is deemed significant. This is not without implications for survivor agency and consent in this phase of the process.
Strategy 2: Redesign Intake as an Intervention Point
Once response was mandatory, outcomes depended on whether early harm was correctly identified and routed. In regions where prevention held, intake was treated as an intervention point rather than neutral administration. Specialized intake reduced delay, misclassification, and fragmentation at first contact. Survivors were less likely to be redirected or dismissed and more likely to reach protective and legal responses earlier. The association between these intake structures and reduced female homicide reflects the prevention value of early, directed engagement rather than generalized processing (Perova and Reynolds 2017). For sexual violence prevention, the lesson is structural. Intake design determines whether early harm translates into action or dissipates across systems.
Implications for New Jersey
A prevention-oriented adaptation would focus on intake redesign rather than service expansion, including:
- Establishing specialized sexual violence and IPV intake pathways within existing institutions.
- Training intake personnel to identify coercive control and sexual harm early.
- Building direct routing from first contact to protection, advocacy, and legal response.
Strategy 3: Treat Protective Measures as Prevention Infrastructure
Even where early response and intake were effective, outcomes depended on what followed. In regions where extreme harm declined, protective measures functioned as active constraints on ongoing violence, not symbolic relief. Protective orders, removal from the home, and restrictions on contact were available early under the Maria da Penha framework. What distinguished regions with better outcomes was the speed, consistency, and enforcement of these measures. Where protective actions were timely and monitored, opportunities for retaliation, coercion, and continued sexual violence narrowed. Where enforcement lagged, risk accumulated (Cerqueira et al. 2015). Evaluation findings show that reductions in murders of women occurring inside the home were strongest where protective measures were paired with enforcement capacity and institutional coordination (Cerqueira et al. 2015). Protection that is slow or symbolic does not interrupt violence trajectories. Protection that is operational does.
Implications for New Jersey
A prevention-oriented adaptation would focus on strengthening protective measures as infrastructure, including:
- Ensuring timely access to the protective order process.
- Ensuring consistent enforcement and monitoring of violations.
- Coordinating protective actions across institutions to reduce gaps in follow-through.
*Note: While these recommendations for on systems-response, community-level prevention are foundational to eradicating sexual violence by shifting norms, the development and inclusion of additional measures layered into this model serve to better address harm and reduce instances of further escalation and recurrence.
Strategy 4: Design Systems to Retain Survivors over Time
Finally, prevention depended on whether survivors could remain engaged long enough for early intervention to hold. In regions with better outcomes, institutions were structured to reduce attrition. Survivors disengage when systems are fragmented, prolonged, or unsafe. Repeated testimony, delays between actions, lack of coordination, and exposure to retaliation erode prevention over time. Where these conditions persisted, early intervention collapsed. Regions with better outcomes shortened timelines, consolidated processes, and maintained continuity across responses. Protective measures were embedded within ongoing monitoring and follow-through. Coordination reduced the burden on survivors to manage their own cases. Where continuity held, engagement held. Where it broke, risk resurfaced. Attrition is not neutral. When survivors disengage, monitoring weakens and coercion becomes easier to reassert.
Implications for New Jersey
A prevention-oriented adaptation would treat retention as a system responsibility, including:
- Minimizing the need for repeat disclosures while still ensuring confidentiality.
- Reducing delays between protective actions and enforcement.
- Measuring disengagement as a prevention failure rather than an individual outcome.
The prevention strategies outlined here are powerful, but they are not comprehensive. They address institutional response to known risk; they do not eliminate all forms of sexual violence, nor do they resolve the structural inequalities that shape who is protected most effectively. Reductions in lethal violence signal that escalation pathways are being interrupted, but they do not capture the full spectrum of sexual harm that never enters formal systems or violence that occurs outside intimate or domestic contexts. This limitation underscores the need to pair institutional reform with continued investment in community-based prevention, survivor-led support, and long-term cultural change. These strategies also do not resolve the tension between protection and overreach. Early, mandatory intervention can carry risks for survivors whose lives are already shaped by surveillance, criminalization, or state intrusion. The solution is not to abandon institutional response, but to build safeguards into it, ensuring survivor choice, limiting unnecessary system involvement, and grounding interventions in trauma-informed practice. Prevention systems must be designed to reduce harm without creating new forms of vulnerability.
Finally, this model does not guarantee durability. Institutional gains are fragile. Political shifts, budget cuts, and leadership changes can weaken enforcement and erode coordination over time. The lesson here is not that prevention is unsustainable, but that it requires maintenance. Clear standards, public accountability, and ongoing evaluation are necessary to prevent backsliding and to adapt strategies as conditions change. What this model ultimately makes possible is clarity. It shows that sexual violence prevention improves when institutions are structured to act early, coordinate consistently, and remain engaged over time. It also makes visible what must be built alongside these strategies, i.e., protections against overreach, pathways for community-based prevention, and mechanisms to sustain reform. Taken together, these insights point toward a prevention approach that is not only effective, but resilient.
Brazil’s experience does not offer New Jersey a set of programs to import. It offers a mirror. The question is not whether similar tools exist here; they largely do. The question is whether they function as prevention or remain discretionary, fragmented, and unevenly enforced. New Jersey already recognizes sexual and intimate partner violence as serious harm. The unresolved issue is whether recognition reliably triggers the necessary and optimal cascade of interventions and responses. Where response remains optional, intake diffuse, protection slow, or follow-through fragile, prevention will not hold. The presence of services is not the same as the presence of systems. If New Jersey is serious about sexual violence prevention, it must be willing to narrow discretion where delay is dangerous but not at the expense of survivor choice, redesign intake where harm is misclassified, enforce protection as infrastructure rather than exception, and treat survivor retention as a measure of institutional performance. Brazil’s Southeast did not eliminate violence. It changed how institutions behaved when violence was already known. That shift is replicable.
[1] Brazil’s Maria da Penha Law (Law No. 11,340/2006) is a comprehensive federal law enacted to prevent and address domestic and family violence against women. Named after survivor Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, the law:
- Establishes protective measures (such as restraining orders and removal of the aggressor from the home)
- Creates specialized domestic violence courts
- Increases penalties for offenders
- Mandates coordinated responses across law enforcement, health, and social services
- Recognizes multiple forms of violence, including physical, psychological, sexual, moral, and economic abuse
WORKS CITED
Brasil. Lei No. 11.340, de 7 de Agosto de 2006 (Lei Maria da Penha). Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, 7 Aug 2006.
Cerqueira, Daniel, et al. Avaliação dos Impactos da Lei Maria da Penha sobre a Violência Doméstica contra as Mulheres no Brasil. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), 2015.
GBD 2019 Brazil Collaborators. “Female Homicides in Brazil: Global Burden of Disease Study, 2000–2018.” BMC Public Health, 2024.
Perova, Elizaveta, and Rodrigo R. Soares Reynolds. “Women’s Police Stations and Domestic Violence: Evidence from Brazil.” Social Science & Medicine, vol. 174, 2017, pp. 188–196.
